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THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROVISIONS OF THE PATRIOT 
ACT: SHOULD THEY BE ALLOWED TO SUNSET? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What is the importance of tracking and preventing the financing of 
terrorism?  The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, commonly referred to as the 9-11 Commission, addressed this question 
directly in the report it produced at the end of its investigation into the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 (“9-11”).1  Specifically, the 9-11 Commission 
recommended that “[v]igorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain 
front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.”2  The Commission explained 
that the primary value of tracking terrorist financing was not necessarily the 
deprivation of funds available to the terrorists, but rather the information that 
could be obtained through investigations of the terrorists’ financial networks.3  
Often, tracking financial networks may prove more effective than traditional 
operational law enforcement at shutting down terrorist networks preemptively, 
particularly when there is an ongoing or long-term investigation.4  However, 
this recommendation of the 9-11 Commission Report could be considered 
preaching to the choir, considering that most of the post 9-11 legislation 
regarding terrorist financing has been designed with this purpose in mind.5  It 
has been argued that even with the exhaustive anti-money laundering controls 
in effect today, the series of transactions that facilitated 9-11 likely would not 
have been noticed in time to prevent it.6  Considering the relatively small 
 
 1. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9-11 
COMMISSION REPORT, 381–82 [hereinafter 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 2. Id. at 382. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Diplomacy in the Age of Terrorism: What is the State Department’s Strategy?: Hearing 
Before Comm. on International Relations H.R., 108th Cong. 67 (2004) (statement of Earl 
Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State). 
 5. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302(b), 
115 Stat. 272, 297 (2001) (defining the purposes of Title III of the Patriot Act). 
 6. Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering, 
and the War on Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 974 (2003).  There is some support for this 
proposition in the 9-11 Commission Report.  The Report notes that the terrorists often secured 
funding through small transactions that were largely unremarkable. 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1362 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1361 
transactions that were carried out and the total number of similar transactions 
that occur around the world in a day, attempting to identify well-disguised 
transactions benefiting terrorism would appear to be similar to looking for a 
needle in a very large haystack.7  The primary anti-money laundering 
legislation enacted after 9-11 was Title III of the Patriot Act, titled the 
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti Terrorist Financing Act 
of 2001.8  Although Title III has been criticized as ineffective in preventing 
day to day transactions that finance terrorism, this Comment concludes that the 
Act must be judged not on its short term success, but rather on its long term 
potential in conjunction with traditional law enforcement and global measures.  
Accordingly, anti-money laundering legislation must be examined with respect 
to facilitating ongoing and extensive investigations rather than as a tool to 
prevent individual acts of terrorism.  Further, the anti-money laundering 
provisions of the Patriot Act should be evaluated in light of their ability to 
disrupt the terrorists’ overall financing system.  This is largely what Title III of 
the Patriot Act is poised to do.9  The Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001 (the “Patriot Act”) was made into law on 
October 26, 2001, shortly over a month after the attacks on September 11, 
2001.10  Despite coming under heavy fire, the Patriot Act remains intact today, 
and, in conjunction with previously enacted legislation, is the primary tool that 
law enforcement officials use to combat terrorist financing and other money 
laundering crimes.  The Act is scheduled to sunset in 2005 unless Congress 
acts and this comment concludes that Title III should be renewed.11 
No discussion of terrorist financing would be complete without addressing 
the issue of money laundering.  Money laundering is “an indispensable 
element of organized criminal activities.”12  It is “the process by which one 
conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and 
disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.”13  Experts sometimes refer 
 
supra note 1, at 224.  The Report also notes that “no financial institution filed a Suspicious 
Activity Report (SAR) . . . with respect to any transaction of any of 19 hijackers before 9/11.”  Id. 
at 528 n.116.  However, the fact that the Report emphasizes the importance of addressing terrorist 
financing indicates that the government realized the legislation should not necessarily target only 
individual acts of terrorism, but rather the comprehensive financing networks. 
 7. See The 9-11 Commission and Efforts to Identify and Combat Terrorist Financing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 2–3 (2004) 
[hereinafter The 9-11 Commission] (statement of John E. Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, 
Counterterrorism Division, Fed. Bureau of Investigation). 
 8. USA Patriot Act § 302(b). 
 9. See id. (defining the purposes of Title III of the Patriot Act). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. §224. 
 12. Christopher Boran, Money Laundering, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 847, 848 (2003). 
 13. Id. at 847. 
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to the money laundering process involved in financing terrorism as “reverse 
money laundering,” because the money sought to be laundered is often 
obtained from legitimate sources and then funneled to illegal purposes.14  
However, the process is substantially similar to traditional money laundering, 
where the source is illegal but the use legitimate.15 
Since 9-11, money laundering has received substantially more attention, 
which is due in large part to leads that may prove that the attacks were partially 
funded by laundered money.16  Prior to 9-11, money laundering legislation was 
primarily backward looking.17  The authorities were interested in using money 
laundering legislation to prosecute crimes that had already occurred.18  
Prosecutors could charge criminals with violations of anti-money laundering 
laws that may be easier to prove than the substantive underlying crime, or they 
could simply tack on money laundering crimes to other charges in order to 
extend the defendant’s sentence.19  The harm was already done and, at worst, 
the criminals could reinvest the money in criminal activities.  However, in the 
context of terrorism, failure to prevent money laundering results in more 
severe consequences.20  Terrorists may use the money to plan for an attack, or 
to obtain the materials and supplies needed to carry out an attack.21  In the case 
of terrorism, money laundering is a predicate offense, and it becomes more 
important to stop the process before it is completed.22  This makes it important 
to establish legislation that is forward looking.23 
Part II of this Comment will explain the process of money laundering, 
focusing in particular on the three stages of the process, followed by a history 
of anti-money laundering legislation in the U.S. up to and including the 
enactment of the Patriot Act.  The Comment will focus on the provisions of the 
 
 14. See Stefan D. Cassella, International Money Laundering: From Latin America to Asia, 
Who Pays?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 116, 121 (2004); W. Clifton Holmes, Strengthening 
Available Evidence-Gathering Tools in the Fight Against Transnational Money Laundering, 24 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 199 (2003). 
 15. Robert E. Sims, Money Laundering and Corruption: Enforcement After September 11th, 
2002 A.B.A. SEC. INT’L L. & PRAC. (Mar. 21–22, 2002) (page unavailable). 
 16. Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money Laundering: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral Policy 
Reforms, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 263, 266 (2003). 
 17. Cassella, supra note 14, at 121. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See generally Teresa E. Adams, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges to White Collar 
Crimes: What Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 
532–34 (2000) (discussing the practice of tacking on money laundering charges to other crimes). 
 20. Cassella, supra note 14, at 121. 
 21. See id. (noting that terrorists will use such funds to perpetrate deadly attacks). 
 22. See id. (noting that “the idea is not to hide dirty money to make it clean, but to hide clean 
money until it can be used to do something evil”). 
 23. See id. (explaining that there is no specific law that criminalizes reverse money 
laundering). 
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Patriot Act that have a substantial impact on U.S. citizens, as these have been 
criticized most heavily.  It will also include a brief discussion of international 
anti-money laundering actions to the extent that they impact the domestic 
provisions of Title III of the Patriot Act.  This discussion will necessarily 
include the criticisms that have been leveled at the existing legislation.  Part III 
will detail the advantages of the paper trail created by the provisions of the 
Patriot Act, addressing several of the primary criticisms that have been leveled 
against it. 
II.  MONEY LAUNDERING AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION 
A. The Crime of Money Laundering 
The process of money laundering can be divided into three stages, the first 
of which is placement.24  The placement stage consists of placing the cash into 
the financial system.25  The second stage is layering.26  This stage involves 
conducting a number of transactions to conceal the source of the money when 
it is derived from criminal activity or the existence of the money when it is 
intended for the financing of illegal activity.27  The final stage is integration.28  
This involves entering the funds into commerce either for legitimate or 
illegitimate means.29  Some experts have criticized dividing the process of 
money laundering into three distinct stages as it is sometimes unclear where 
one stage begins and the other ends.30  Also, concentrating on an old model 
might prevent legislators from thinking creatively about how to attack money 
laundering issues.31  However, both academics and the law enforcement 
community continue to refer to the different stages when discussing the issue.32 
1. Placement 
The placement stage involves introducing the money into the financial 
system in a way that it can then be maneuvered through a series of complex 
transactions so as to conceal the source of the money.  The money launderer 
faces the most risk at this point because “there exists a direct connection 
 
 24. SANDEEP SAVLA, MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 10 
(2001). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 10–11. 
 28. Id. at 11. 
 29. SAVLA, supra note 24, at 11. 
 30. See id. at 10–11. 
 31. See id. at 11. 
 32. Id. 
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between the profits and the crime.”33  Also, introducing large amounts of cash 
into the financial system is likely to attract attention from law enforcement 
officials.34  As a result, most anti-money laundering legislation is aimed at this 
stage of the process.35  However, the three-stage model has been criticized for 
placing too much emphasis on the placement stage.36  In the case of terrorism, 
the money in question is often deposited before, rather than after, the criminal 
act.37  In this case, the placement stage would not occur.38  This might occur 
when a wealthy donor seeks to launder funds that are already in the financial 
system, or when the funds are collected in the name of a charity and remain 
legitimate until they are funneled to terrorist activities.39  In these cases, the 
placement stage occurs when the money is ostensibly legitimate, and 
legislation aimed at the placement phase is less effective. 
The placement of funds into the financial system has become increasingly 
difficult to detect due to the large number of ways in which to accomplish it.40  
Depositing the funds into a traditional depositary institution is only one of the 
ways to accomplish the placement stage.41  Obviously, this would be the most 
risky considering the extensive regulation of financial institutions and the 
comprehensive records retained.42  As a result, money launderers have become 
adept at sidestepping the financial system.43  In order to avoid the deposit of 
large sums of money that may facilitate detection, they use a process called 
“smurfing.”44  The process of smurfing involves a number of people making 
small deposits in a number of different depositary institutions so as to avoid 
detection.45  Initially, the “smurfs” made deposits only slightly under the 
amount that would trigger a report.46  However, banks began to recognize these 
 
 33. PETER LILLEY, DIRTY DEALING: THE UNTOLD TRUTH ABOUT GLOBAL MONEY 
LAUNDERING, INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM 51–52 (2nd ed. 2003). 
 34. Sims, supra note 15 (page unavailable). 
 35. LILLEY, supra note 33, at 52. 
 36. SAVLA, supra note 24, at 10–11. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 11. 
 39. Cassella, supra note 14, at 121; see Alicia L. Rause, USA Patriot Act: Anti-Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Legislation in the U.S. and Europe Since September 11th, 11 
U. MIAMI INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 173, 184 (2003) (explaining that terrorist groups often obtain 
their financing from “legal” businesses and charities). 
 40. Madelyn J. Daley, Effectiveness of United States and International Efforts to Combat 
International Money Laundering, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 175, 179 
(2000). 
 41. Id. at 177–78. 
 42. Id. at 177. 
 43. Id. at 178–79. 
 44. LILLEY, supra note 33, at 52. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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as suspicious and report them accordingly.47  As a result, the amounts have 
dipped even further, and hence become more difficult to detect.48  Although 
many financial institutions are required to maintain anti-money laundering 
compliance programs that target these operations, with the help of new 
technology and professionals such as attorneys and accountants, there is an 
ever increasing number of ways in which to accomplish the placement stage.49 
The developing process of “smurfing” demonstrates the difficulty of 
eradicating money laundering.  In the U.S., the Constitution requires that the 
law must be known to the people before they can be held accountable for 
violating it.50  However, knowing the law is knowing how to avoid the law.  
Money launderers, including those seeking to finance terrorism, can avoid 
many of the events that would trigger a financial institution’s reporting 
requirements with sufficient planning and preparation.  Often they will seek 
the assistance of attorneys, accountants, or other professionals who are familiar 
with the law and can instruct them on how to avoid detection.51  As money 
launderers break up their deposits into smaller increments, and spread them 
among increasingly varying financial institutions, these institutions are 
required to report an ever increasing number of transactions.52  While this 
process may result in increased exposure for the “smurfers,” it also creates 
more work for regulatory bodies due to the increased number of reports to 
analyze.53  Also, as money laundering networks become more dependent on 
“smurfs,” they create wider barriers between the low level operatives making 
the deposits and the “kingpins” responsible for the underlying crimes, in order 
to compensate for the increased risk of the operatives being detected and 
caught.54 
Another option is to avoid the financial institutions altogether.  Money 
launderers have come up with a number of ways to conceal the source of the 
money before it is ever entered into the financial system.  These include 
purchasing expensive property and reselling it, and creating legitimate or semi-
legitimate businesses that typically deal primarily in cash in order to obscure 
the source of the money.55  Businesses that are susceptible to criminal 
 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Daley, supra note 40, at 178–79. 
 50. U.S. v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 678 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 51. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Peter A. Gallo, SR-IX: Using the Wrong Tool in the Wrong Place, THE J. OF TURKISH 
WKLY. (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=3427. 
 54. See id. (noting that reporting requirements have “not been spectacularly successful in 
bringing down the heads of the trafficking syndicates”).  Obviously law enforcement officials are 
more interested in catching those responsible for the underlying criminal activity, rather than low 
level operatives whose only act may be depositing the money into the financial system. 
 55. See, e.g., BOB BLUNDEN, THE MONEY LAUNDERERS 20 (2001). 
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manipulation include non-profit organizations,56 and businesses that 
traditionally deal in large amounts of cash. 
2. Layering 
The second step in the money laundering process, layering, involves 
moving the money in a way that makes it untraceable, while still retaining 
control over the money itself.57  The layering process can be accomplished in a 
number of ways, most of them involving a large number of transactions that 
make it increasingly difficult to trace the money to its original source.58  In 
fact, one commentator has argued that the term “layering” is misleading, 
because it indicates that the true ownership of the money can be revealed 
simply by peeling back the layers.59  He has claimed that in reality, the process 
could more accurately be termed “kaleidoscopic in nature,” a multitude of 
parallel, rather than progressive transactions.60  The crime of money laundering 
becomes considerably more difficult to detect at the layering stage.61  Often at 
this stage the money has been divided into smaller amounts, and perhaps even 
mixed in with legitimate funds.62  Also, due to the developments in technology 
and globalization, money is becoming easier to move not only between 
different accounts and financial institutions, but between different nations.63  
However, there are a number of traits that might indicate money laundering 
activities.  Among these are (1) seemingly nonsensical financial transactions, 
(2) large numbers of sales and purchases of investments subject to 
commissions, (3) numerous accounts, seemingly unconnected, being 
consolidated into a smaller number of accounts, and (4) “lack of concern over 
losses on investments, bank charges or professional advisor charges.”64  
Money launderers are generally not concerned with losses or charges, as their 
primary concern is eliminating the paper trail. 
 
 56. Non-profit organizations are often used by terrorist organizations, leading the Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering to specifically include increased scrutiny for these 
organizations in their Eight Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.  See Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering: Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Oct. 31, 2001), 
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/SRecTF_en/pdf. 
 57. SAVLA, supra note 24, at 13. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Hence the term sometimes given to the layering stage is “commingling.”  LILLEY, supra 
note 33, at 53. 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. Id. at 53. 
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One of the primary tools of money launderers during the layering stage is 
the use of off-shore banks with stringent bank secrecy laws.65  The banks in 
these jurisdictions often have very lax reporting requirements, and are 
susceptible to abuse by criminal activity, whether intentional or not.66  The 
U.S. has made progress in the period of time since 9-11 in facilitating 
information-sharing with many of these countries.67  However, much of this 
information-sharing is predicated upon the U.S. providing probable cause of 
criminal activity unrelated to tax evasion.68  The reporting has not reached a 
level where it is automatically provided for analysis, but rather reactively when 
criminal activity is already suspected.69  Therefore, once the money has 
worked its way into the banking systems of these jurisdictions, it will rarely be 
detected independently of separate criminal investigation.70  Legislators must 
focus on agreements with other countries, particularly those considered off-
shore banking countries, if they are to have any success in stopping money 
laundering after the placement stage.71 
With the use of technology, money laundering can be facilitated by 
moving money between accounts and through intermediaries in off-shore 
accounts simply by using a computer service.72  Due to the overwhelmingly 
large number of electronic and wire transactions that occur each day, it would 
be impractical to monitor them all, even with international cooperation.73 
3. Integration 
The final stage of the money laundering process is the integration of the 
funds back into commerce.  At this time the money has been divided up, 
possibly intermingled with legitimate funds, and moved between a number of 
banks, accounts, and nations, making it almost impossible to trace.74  If the 
 
 65. Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide Hundreds of Billions in Cayman Accounts, 34 
TAX NOTES INT’L 898, 902 (2004). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 903. 
 68. Id. at 903–04. 
 69. Id. 
 70. SAVLA, supra note 24, at 14. 
 71. Several international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), and 
Financial Stability Forum have been targeting offshore bank secrecy for a number of years 
through blacklists and sanctions.  See Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorism Financial Enforcement Regimes After September 11, 2001, 22 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 123, 136–37 (2004). 
 72. JEFFREY ROBINSON, THE LAUNDRYMEN: INSIDE MONEY LAUNDERING, THE WORLD’S 
THIRD-LARGEST BUSINESS 30–31 (1996). 
 73. Id. at 31.  As of 1996, “more than five hundred thousand wire transfers, representing in 
excess of $1 trillion, electronically circle[d] the globe daily.”  Id. 
 74. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 295. 
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money has been laundered successfully, there will be little or no way to 
determine the original source.  This is desirable to terrorists whether the money 
was originally legitimate or not.  If the original source of the funds cannot be 
determined, then that source can continue to provide funds to other terrorists.  
It is at this time that the money can be used with relative impunity to purchase 
the goods or services necessary to implement an attack. 
B. Anti-Money Laundering Legislation 
Prior to 9-11, little attention was given to anti-money laundering 
legislation.  Money launderers were rarely prosecuted successfully, for a 
variety of reasons.75  Also, there was a trend away from requiring reporting 
from financial institutions due to privacy concerns.76  Since 9-11, these 
concerns have been overlooked in part because of the increased scrutiny of 
terrorism.77  While civil libertarians leveled significant criticism at much of the 
legislation in response to the increasingly invasive reporting requirements, 
others view the legislation as long overdue.78  Prior to 9-11, the primary tool 
for combating money laundering 9-11 was the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 
(BSA).79  After 9-11, the Patriot Act largely amended the BSA in an effort to 
combat terrorism more effectively by closing loopholes in the BSA and by 
addressing the international nature of money laundering.80  The BSA as 
amended by the USA Patriot Act provides the primary tools used to combat 
money laundering in the United States. 
1. The Bank Secrecy Act 
The BSA served as a landmark in the history of money laundering 
legislation.  It was Congress’s first foray into the arena of money laundering 
legislation.81  The BSA referred to Titles I and II of the Bank Records and 
 
 75. Lisa A. Barbot, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TUL. J. INT’L. & 
COMP. L. 161, 193–98 (1995).  These factors may include, among others: (1) the complexity of 
money laundering; (2) lax anti-money laundering legislation in various parts of the world; (3) tax 
havens; (4) various bank secrecy laws; (5) corporate secrecy; and (6) attorney–client privilege 
issues.  Id. at 194–98. 
 76. Denise Couture, Muted Response to U.S. Law, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 31, 2001, at 
21; Megan Roberts, Big Brother Isn’t Just Watching You, He’s Also Wasting Your Tax Payer 
Dollars: An Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 573, 582 (2004). 
 77. See Couture, supra note 76, at 21. 
 78. Id.  Much of the criticism revolves around the same issues that were dispensed within 
California Bankers Assn. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
 79. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114; see Matthew S. Morgan, Money Laundering: The 
American Law and Its Global Influence, 3 NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. AM. 24, 26 (1997). 
 80. See generally Zagaris, supra note 71, at 133–36. 
 81. Morgan, supra note 79, at 26. 
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Foreign Transactions Act that became law in 1970.82  The stated purpose of the 
BSA was “to require the maintenance of appropriate types of records by 
insured banks in the United States where such records have a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.”83  In 
effect, the BSA sought to create a paper trail with regard to large transactions 
to be used by government agencies to detect and pursue criminal activity.84  
The BSA did not criminalize the act of money laundering, but rather sought to 
use the records to prosecute the underlying criminal activity inherent in money 
laundering.  The underlying criminal activities of money laundering range 
from simple tax evasion to drug trafficking and terrorism. 
The BSA has been continuously amended since its enactment, and has 
been described as a “chess game pitting those seeking to launder illicit monies 
against those seeking to stop them.”85  This describes the unique qualities of 
anti-money laundering legislation.  Often those who seek to launder money 
have specialized knowledge of the financial industry, or have retained the 
services of professionals with such knowledge.86 
The BSA does not actually specify the type of reports that financial 
institutions must file, but rather serves as an enabling statute that authorizes the 
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations to that end.87  The most 
significant contribution to the current anti-money laundering regulatory 
scheme is a regulation issued by the Secretary of the Treasury that requires 
financial institutions, as defined by the BSA, to file Currency Transaction 
Reports (CTRs).  The regulation provides that “[w]hen a domestic financial 
institution is involved in a transaction for the payment, receipt, or transfer of 
United States coins or currency” over the amount of $10,000, the institution 
must file a CTR.88 
The constitutionality of the BSA was challenged shortly after its 
enactment, and in 1974 the issue came before the Supreme Court in California 
Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz.89  A group of banks, financial institutions, and their 
customers sought to enjoin the enforcement of the regulations promulgated by 
the Secretary of Treasury, claiming, inter alia, that the reporting requirements 
 
 82. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2000). 
 83. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 § 101. 
 84. Zagaris, supra note 71, at 125–26. 
 85. Morgan, supra note 79, at 27. 
 86. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 281–82.  Part of the reason that money laundering 
itself was criminalized in the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 was to curb the 
involvement of professionals such as accountants and attorneys in money laundering activities.  
Id.  While the professionals may not have been involved in the underlying crimes, and indeed 
may not have even had knowledge of the underlying crimes, they could still be prosecuted for 
money laundering offenses.  Id. 
 87. See Morgan, supra note 79, at 28. 
 88. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b) (2005). 
 89. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
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amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.90  The banks were concerned with the costs of implementing the 
regulations and claimed that the reporting requirements were sufficiently 
demanding as to constitute a violation of due process.91  Justice Rehnquist 
dismissed this due process argument decisively, stating that the issue “[did] not 
warrant extended treatment.”92  The Court further explained that the BSA was 
passed only after extensive congressional findings that provided evidence that 
most of the required records were maintained by banks in the regular course of 
business.93  Therefore, it would have been difficult to establish a significant 
burden on the banks. 
The customers, represented by the ACLU, were concerned about the 
invasion of privacy that resulted from banks disclosing information about their 
currency transactions.94  Justice Douglas expressed sympathy for this point of 
view in his dissenting opinion, explaining that “[i]n a sense a person is defined 
by the checks he writes.”95  Justice Douglas went on to write that “[b]y 
examining them the agents get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political 
allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers 
and magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum.”96  Further, Justice Douglas 
theorized that recording all of our phone conversations would most likely aid 
criminal investigations, though clearly in violation of the Fourth Amendment.97  
It should be noted in response to Justice Douglas’s criticism, however, that 
most of the records the BSA required to be maintained were generally kept 
prior to its enactment, distinguishing it from a situation where a person’s phone 
calls were recorded, with no apparent independent purpose.98  The Court 
recognized that the purpose of the BSA was merely to insure that all banks met 
a minimum standard.99  Moreover, the vast majority of customer transactions 
would not be reported.  Only those that met the reporting requirements, those 
in excess of $10,000, would be reported automatically.100  The majority 
 
 90. Id. at 41. 
 91. Id. at 42–43. 
 92. Id. at 50. 
 93. Id. at 52–53. 
 94. California Bankers Ass’n, 416 U.S. at 43. 
 95. Id. at 85. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Robert S. Pasley, Privacy Rights v. Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement, 6 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 147, 195 (2002). 
Further, the BSA does not require the banks to “spy” on their customers, but instead to 
simply retain copies of documents that the banks already possess, to which banks are a 
party, and that were found to “have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or 
regulatory investigations or proceedings” and to report “abnormally large transactions in 
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dismissed the claims and upheld the BSA and the regulations promulgated by 
the Secretary of Treasury, finding that the reporting requirements did not 
amount to a taking and that there was not a violation of due process as the state 
had a legitimate interest in the information.101  The Court focused specifically 
on the damage that money laundering did to the tax system.102  Although the 
Court mentioned the facilitation of criminal activity inherent in money 
laundering, this was not the primary focus.103  The Court dismissed the claims 
based on the filed CTR, holding that customers who did not engage in the type 
of $10,000 domestic currency transaction requiring reporting lacked standing 
to challenge the domestic reporting regulations.104 
Shortly thereafter, the issue again came before the Supreme Court in U.S. 
v. Miller.105  This time, the Court addressed the customer’s complaint and held 
that customers of banks had no expectation of privacy with regard to 
information that they had voluntarily disclosed to a third party.106  The Court 
went on to explain that when customers disclosed transactional information to 
the bank, they should expect that the bank would convey the information to the 
government, regardless of whether the customer expects that the third party 
will keep the information privileged and use it for a specified purpose.107  The 
Court seemed to take the stance that the bank was not acting as a government 
agent even though the documents in question were maintained pursuant to the 
BSA.  Rather, the Court viewed the records as those that should be kept in the 
ordinary course of business, for which the BSA set minimum standards. 
The decisions in California Bankers Assn. and Miller were significant 
because they provided constitutional validity to the regulatory scheme 
established by the BSA.  Thirty years after these cases were decided, they are 
still relevant because, although the BSA has been amended a number of times, 
the basic regulatory scheme remains the same.  These two cases set the stage 
for an expansive regulatory scheme based on financial institutions reporting 
the activity of their customers. 
Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the BSA, there 
continue to be critics of the reporting requirements.  These critics have 
 
currency.”  These reportable cash transactions in excess of $10,000 are, in fact, unusual 
for most individuals and certainly do not constitute “all bank records of every citizen.”  
Nor do these large cash transactions indicate in any way a customer’s “religion, ideology, 
opinions, and interests.” 
Id. at 197. 
 101. California Bankers Ass’n., 416 U.S. at 50–52. 
 102. Id. at 27–28. 
 103. Id. at 26–30. 
 104. Id. at 68. 
 105. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 106. Id. at 443. 
 107. Id. 
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expressed concern over the fact that the financial institutions are essentially 
forced to spy on their own customers.108  One commentator analogized the 
BSA reporting requirements to “effectively deputizing bank tellers to act as 
law-enforcement agents against their own customers.”109  Privacy issues were 
raised by legislators prior to the bill’s enactment, and continued to be of 
concern, until the 9-11 attacks largely quieted the movement.110 
During the period after the BSA was first enacted, many financial 
institutions failed to fully comply with the regulations.111  It was not until 
February 1985, when the U.S. Treasury fined the Bank of Boston $500,000 for 
a failure to report over 1,100 transactions totaling over $1.6 billion that the 
banking industry began to take the regulations seriously.112  In part, this led to 
the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA).113  However, thirty-four 
years after its enactment, although revised a number of times, the BSA 
continues to provide one of the most commonly used tools in fighting money 
laundering, and financial institutions may face stiff penalties for the failure to 
adhere to it.114  The approach to money laundering established by the BSA is 
largely still intact, and continues to inform efforts to address the issue. 
2. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 
In 1986, Congress determined that the BSA as enacted had not been 
effective in controlling money laundering.115  As a result, Congress enacted the 
MLCA as a part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.116  The MLCA went a 
step further than the BSA, and actually criminalized the act of money 
laundering.117  The MLCA also protected financial institutions from civil 
liability for providing information to the government, referred to as “safe 
harbor” provisions.118  It also addressed the inflexible reporting requirements 
 
 108. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 304–05. 
 109. David S. Cloud & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Treasury Seeks to Ease Costliness of 
Antilaundering Rules on Banks, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2001, at A4. 
 110. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 304. 
 111. See Morgan, supra note 79, at 28–29. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Pub. L. No. 99-750, 100 Stat. 3207; see Morgan, supra note 79, at 29. 
 114. See, e.g., Robert G. Bagnall, Anti-Money Laundering, SJ095 ALI-ABA 222, 236–37 
(2004).  In July 2001, U.S. Trust Corporation consented to a $10 million civil penalty for failing 
to “maintain proper controls and procedures relating to BSA compliance.”  Id. at 236.  A few 
months later, in November 2001, the State Bank of India consented to a $7.5 million penalty for 
similar conduct.  Id. 
 115. Morgan, supra note 79, at 29. 
 116. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; see Morgan, supra note 79, at 29; Zagaris, supra 
note 71, at 126. 
 117. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956, 1957) [hereinafter MLCA]. 
 118. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 293–96. 
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created by the BSA.119  Under the BSA, only transactions that exceeded the 
amount prescribed by the Secretary of Treasury ($10,000) would be 
reported.120  Money launderers became adept at smurfing (breaking up the 
transactions to smaller amounts) to avoid drawing attention.121  Courts were 
split regarding whether structuring the transactions violated the statute.122  As a 
result, the MLCA criminalized the act of structuring transactions in order to 
“cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a 
[required report].”123  This was largely in response to the confusion by both the 
courts and the financial institutions regarding whether structuring violated the 
regulations as promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury.124  A number of 
banks were already filing CTRs when deposits were structured in a way to 
avoid reporting requirements.125 
Financial institutions may face stiff penalties for failing to observe the 
aggregation reporting requirements.  The Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCen), the agency responsible for enforcing the BSA and 
subsequent amendments, including the Patriot Act, recently issued an opinion 
regarding aggregating transactions in a case involving Western Union.126  
 
 119. Jimmy Gurule, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating a New Federal 
Offense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative Means of Punishing Specified 
Unlawful Activity?, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823, 825 (1995). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. The regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with the BSA 
stated: 
Each financial institution shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of 
currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution, which 
involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000.  Such reports shall be made on 
forms prescribed by the Secretary and all information called for in the forms shall be 
furnished. 
31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) (1980).  The courts took a variety of positions regarding whether 
“smurfing” or structuring deposits to avoid the filing requirements violated the statute.  The First 
Circuit held that the regulations as written violated the Fifth Amendment due process clause.  
U.S. v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1985).  The Seventh Circuit held that the banks had 
no duty to report transactions under the $10,000 ceiling, and thus structuring deposits did not 
constitute a crime.  U.S. v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1987).  At the other end of the 
spectrum, the Second Circuit appeared to adopt a policy it referred to as structural liability, and 
held that structuring transactions so as to avoid reporting requirements was a crime.  U.S. v. 
Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1986).  The issue became moot when the MLCA was 
passed, as it specifically criminalized the structuring of transactions.  Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1354, 
100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2002)). 
 123. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 § 1354. 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 125. Id. 
 126. In re Western Union Financial Services, Inc., No. 2003-02, Treas. Dep’t Fin. Crimes 
Enforcement Network (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/western_union_ 
assessment.pdf). 
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Western Union consented to a civil penalty of $3 million.127  In the opinion, 
FinCen reiterated previous findings that transactions made by the same person, 
or on behalf of the same person and known to the financial institution, must be 
aggregated with regard to the CTR reporting requirements, even if they are 
made among different agents.128 
The legislative history of the MLCA does not indicate any significant 
interest in terrorism.129  Rather, Congress seemed more concerned with 
professionals in legitimate businesses turning a blind eye to clients that were 
involved in money laundering schemes.130  This was criminalized in the 
MLCA, which makes it illegal to knowingly engage in a transaction for an 
amount of more than $10,000 where the money is derived from unlawful 
activity.131  The government does not need to prove the defendant had 
knowledge that the money was derived from unlawful activity, only that the 
defendant knowingly engaged in the transaction.132  The purpose was to 
eliminate the defense of willful blindness by professionals with specialized 
knowledge of money laundering laws.133  In effect, the Act was used mostly to 
prosecute those involved in drug sales.134  Some scholars claimed that the 
MLCA did not define a new type of illegal conduct, but rather allowed new 
ways to prosecute underlying offenses that may have been more difficult to 
prove.135  As a result, the MLCA added little to the detection and prosecution 
of those who finance terrorism.136  The MLCA’s primary contribution was the 
criminalization of money laundering.137 
3. The Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992 
The Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992138 was passed 
in response to inflexibility in the existing anti-money laundering scheme.139  It 
 
 127. Id. at 5. 
 128. Id. at 2. 
 129. See generally Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 291. 
 130. Gurule, supra note 119, at 825. 
 131. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352, 100 Stat. 3207 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2000)). 
 132. See Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 292 (explaining that “[t]he government must 
prove: 1) that illicit funds were derived from one of the [specified unlawful activities] in the 
statute; and 2) that the defendant engaged in the [specified unlawful activity], then laundered the 
illicit proceeds”). 
 133. Gurule, supra note 119, at 825. 
 134. See id. at 853–54. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 853 (arguing that Congressional intent was limited to attacking the activities of 
“post-crime hiding and reinvesting of illicit profits to continue proscribed criminal activity”). 
 137. See id. 
 138. Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
Titles 12, 18, and 31 of the U.S. Code). 
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was becoming apparent to legislators that money launderers were becoming 
increasingly sophisticated, and quickly adapting to anti-money laundering 
legislation.140  CTRs are inflexible, and law enforcement officials felt that a 
significant amount of illegal activity was still going unnoticed due to 
“smurfing.”141  As a response, the Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering 
Act created the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR),142 and in effect shifted to 
the banking community the responsibility of determining which transactions 
should be reported.143  The Act specifically prohibited notifying the subject of 
the SAR that he had been reported.144  The constitutional validity of the SAR 
has not been seriously challenged.  However, courts have had the opportunity 
to consider the prohibition on notification of the subject of the report.  The 
courts have recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in keeping the 
SAR confidential so as not to “compromise an ongoing law enforcement 
investigation, provide information to a criminal wishing to evade detection, or 
reveal the methods by which banks are able to detect suspicious activity.”145 
According to the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
financial institutions were required to file a SAR with the proper regulatory 
authority for “any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law 
or regulation.”146  The regulations also lowered the threshold amount from 
$10,000, as required by a CTR, to $5,000.147  The Act provided for strict 
liability for the failure to file a report, while at the same time providing 
immunity to the financial institutions for filing an unnecessary report in good 
 
 139. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against 
Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 
362–63 (2003); see also Patricia Shaughnessy, The New EU Money-Laundering Directive: 
Lawyers As Gate-Keepers and Whistle Blowers, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 25, 25 (2002) (“As 
developments in technology and in the financial sector allowed for increasingly complex 
transnational transactions, money-launderers became more sophisticated, employed new 
channels, and became linked not only with drug traffickers, but also with other criminal groups, 
including terrorists.”). 
 140. See Cuellar, supra note 139, at 362–63. 
 141. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 967. 
 142. Annunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act of 1992 § 1517; see also Gouvin, supra note 6, 
at 967. 
 143. Morgan, supra note 79, at 41–42. 
 144. Annunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act of 1992 § 1517(g)(2). 
 145. Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (S.D. Tex. 2004); see also 
Cotton v. PrivateBank & Trust Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 809, 815 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[T]he disclosure 
of [a] SAR may harm the privacy interests of innocent people whose names may be contained 
therein.”). 
 146. 31 C.F.R. § 103.20(a)(1) (2005). 
 147. 31 C.F.R. § 103.20(a)(3). 
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faith.148  The result was the “generation of large numbers of extraneous 
reports,” reporting mostly innocent activity.149 
The Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act also required that each 
financial institution implement an Anti-Money Laundering Program.150  The 
Secretary of the Treasury was required to implement regulations that would 
require at a minimum: “(A) the development of internal policies, procedures, 
and controls, (B) the designation of a compliance officer, (C) an ongoing 
employee training program, and (D) an independent audit function to test 
programs.”151 
Both the SAR and the anti-money laundering program provisions are still 
intact today, and have been significantly expanded by the Patriot Act. 
4. The Patriot Act 
Shortly after the attacks on 9-11, Congress passed the Patriot Act in 
response to the new focus on terrorism.152  Significant criticism has been aimed 
at the Patriot Act since its enactment regarding the method in which it was 
 
 148. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 967–68.  The immunity only extends to reports made to law 
enforcement agencies.  Nevin v. Citibank, N.A., 107 F. Supp. 2d 333, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(holding that a financial institution was not immune from suit when the SAR was provided to 
another private party).  However, the financial institutions are immune from liability for a variety 
of disclosures, including “(i.) A disclosure of any possible law or regulation, (ii.) A disclosure 
pursuant to § 5318(g) itself, or (iii.) A disclosure pursuant to any other authority.”  Coronado v. 
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 222 F.3d 1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (holding that 
a grand jury subpoena qualifies as “other authority,” that safe harbor is not limited to CTR, and 
that any provision grants the financial institution complete immunity).  But see Lopez v. First 
Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 129 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that “verbal 
instructions” did not qualify as “other authority” under safe harbor provisions). 
 149. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 967.  Although innocent conduct is routinely reported, the 
courts have protected the privacy interest of the subject of the SAR.  While the information is 
provided to the government, the courts have not allowed the documents to be provided to third 
parties.  See Cotton, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (holding that SAR was not discoverable, but 
documents of underlying transaction were); see also Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 682–83. 
[Financial institutions] are protected from the production of communications they made to 
governmental agencies or officials reporting possible or suspected violations of laws or 
regulations by the defendants, or pertaining to such reports.  Such communications may 
consist of a SAR itself; communications pertaining to a SAR or its contents; 
communications preceding the filing of a SAR and preparatory or preliminary to it; 
communications that follow the filing of a SAR and are explanations or follow-up 
discussions; or oral communications or suspected or possible violations that did not 
culminate in the filing of a SAR. 
Id. 
 150. Annunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-550, § 1517(h), 106 Stat. 
4044 (1992) (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 5314). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 291. 
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passed.  The bill saw almost no opposition in either the House or the Senate.153  
After the Patriot Act became law, it was discovered that many legislators either 
did not attempt to, or did not have time to, study the provisions of the Act 
before they had to vote.154  While this is certainly a disturbing commentary on 
the state of Congress, careful study might not have had as large of an effect on 
the final form of Title III as it would have had on other provisions of the 
Patriot Act.155  Much of the legislation included in Title III has been debated in 
the public arena for a number of years, even dating back to the 1970s when 
money laundering legislation first came into play with the BSA.156  Although 
some have criticized the legislation based on the fact that it was defeated a 
number of times, this may also indicate that the legislation was not quite as 
rushed as it seemed.  Rather, one could determine that 9-11 provided the 
motivation, or increased state interest, that was necessary to justify the 
increased imposition on financial institutions.157  The amendments to the BSA 
in the Patriot Act expanded the reach of the BSA and subjected a number of 
new financial institutions, including informal money transfer services, to the 
reporting requirements previously enacted.158  These institutions were also 
required to implement anti-money laundering provisions.159  The Patriot Act 
also requires banks and other financial institutions to implement customer 
identification programs, commonly referred to as “know your customer” 
(KYC) provisions.160  As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the 
Patriot Act did not significantly alter the nature of the regulatory scheme, but 
rather expanded the existing scheme. 
a. Industries Subjected to BSA Requirements 
The industries that are subject to the anti-money laundering provisions 
after the enactment of the Patriot Act are “mutual funds; operators of credit 
card systems; money services businesses, such as money transfer companies 
and check cashers; securities brokers and dealers registered with the Securities 
 
 153. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 960–61. 
 154. Id. 
 155. But see Gilbert NMO Morris, Issues in Title III Compliance Under the USA Patriot Act, 
28 TAX NOTES INT’L 385, 387 (2002). 
 156. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 963; Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 300–01 
(summarizing proposed legislation that was not enacted from 1998–2001). 
 157. See Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 290–91; see also Michael T. McCarthy, USA 
Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 451 (2002) (suggesting that the sweeping legislation in 
the Patriot Act might not have been solely a rushed power grab, but rather that “lawmakers may 
have reached a measured conclusion that the attacks had indeed changed assumptions about the 
nature of the threat to domestic security, and that prior political conceptions about executive 
authority were no longer apt”). 
 158. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 970. 
 159. Id. at 971. 
 160. Id. at 970. 
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and Exchange Commission; and futures commission merchants and 
accompanying introducing brokers registered with the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission.”161  One of the requirements was that they file SARs.  
According to 12 C.F.R. § 21.11, banks and other financial institutions must file 
a SAR with FinCEN when 
the bank knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that: (i) [t]he transaction 
involves funds derived from illegal activities or is intended or conducted in 
order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activities . . . as 
part of a plan to violate or evade any law or regulation or to avoid any 
transaction reporting requirement under Federal law; (ii) [t]he transaction is 
designed to evade any regulations promulgated under the Bank Secrecy Act; or 
(iii) [t]he transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the 
sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage, 
and the institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after 
examining the available facts, including the background and possible purpose 
of the transaction.162 
The Patriot Act also shored up the “safe harbor” provision, so that financial 
institutions are largely immune for filing SARs unnecessarily.163  Congress 
entrusted the enforcement of the Patriot Act and previous BSA provisions to 
FinCEN.164 
SARs are generally completed by those who come into direct contact with 
depositors of money.  A potential problem of SAR reporting is that there is 
little motivation to report this activity.  Unlike other crimes where there is an 
identifiable victim, the ultimate harm of money laundering is not quite as 
apparent.165  Suspicious Activity Reports often require the initiative of 
relatively low level operatives within an organization, who may be deterred by 
the extensive reporting requirements.  The Treasury Department has outlined 
 
 161. Morris, supra note 155, at 390. 
 162. 12 CFR § 21.11(c)(4) (2005). 
 163. The Patriot Act provided: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, any consumer reporting agency or agent 
or employee thereof making disclosure of consumer reports or other information pursuant 
to this section in good-faith reliance upon a certification of a governmental agency 
pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not be liable to any person for such 
disclosure under this subchapter, the constitution of any State, or any law or regulation of 
any State or any political subdivision of any State. 
Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 626(e), 115 Stat. 272, 328 (2001) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1681).  Section 302(b)(9) of the Patriot Act stated that one of the purposes was “to 
clarify the terms of the safe harbor from civil liability for filing suspicious activity reports.” § 
302(b)(9). 
 164. Patriot Act § 361. 
 165. See Daley, supra note 40, at 179 (“Money laundering is a paperless crime, without 
physical violence directed at individuals.”). 
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specific circumstances in which a CTR is required.166  Financial institutions 
therefore generally have little difficulty determining when a CTR should be 
filed.  However, the situations in which an SAR is required are less specific.  
While many large depositary institutions have created a position for a 
compliance officer, and have attempted to instruct the lower-level operatives of 
what these situations might be, there is still a high degree of discretion at the 
lower levels.  Money laundering can most easily be detected by employees 
who have a personal exchange with the money launderer.167  In the case of the 
largest money transfer company, Western Union, the employees responsible 
for completing the SARs might not even be employees of Western Union.168  
Many Western Union locations are operated by independent contractors who 
provide the money transfer service via Western Union, but are employed by 
the facility from which the service is offered.169  The limited relationship 
between Western Union and the independent contractor may make it even 
more difficult for Western Union to enforce and monitor compliance with the 
reporting requirements.170 
Significantly, section 359 of the Patriot Act extends financial reporting 
requirements to informal value transfer systems (IVTS).171  The Patriot Act 
also establishes criminal penalties for unlicensed money transfer services.172  
This requirement appears to be aimed at hawalas, which are a type of IVTS 
 
 166. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 167. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 281. 
 168. Heather Timmons, Terrorist Money by Wire, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 94. 
 169. Id.  The investigation into 9-11 has provided evidence that many of the terrorists 
involved in the attack transferred or received money through Western Union terminals in places 
such as a Mail Boxes, Etc. and Giant Supermarket in Laurel, Maryland.  Heather Timmons, 
Western Union: Where the Money Is—In Small Bills, BUS. WK., Nov. 26, 2001, at 40.  There 
were also transfers in and out of Logan Airport and the Boston bus station.  Id. 
 170. Western Union recently settled an action brought by New York’s banking regulators for 
$8 million without admitting wrongdoing.  Gouvin, supra note 6, at 965.  The regulators alleged 
that Western Union had violated state and federal currency transaction reports.  Id. 
 171. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 359, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended at 
31 U.S.C. §§ 5312, 5318, 5330). 
 172. Id. § 373.  The section defines unlicensed money transmitting business as one that 
(A) is operated without an appropriate money transmitting license in a State where such 
operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony under State law, whether or not 
the defendant knew that the operation was required to be licensed or that the 
operation was so punishable; 
(B) fails to comply with the money transmitting business registration requirements under 
section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or regulations prescribed under such 
section; or 
(C) otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the 
defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used . . . 
to promote or support unlawful activity. 
Id. 
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that ties much of the Islamic world together financially.173  The purpose of 
these systems is to transfer value between people, often in different countries, 
without actually moving the money.174  The potential value to terrorists is that 
the process leaves a sparse money trail, if a trail exists at all.  The process is 
relatively simple.  An individual will go to a hawaladar in one country and 
request that money be transferred to an individual in another country.175  The 
hawaladar will give the individual wishing to transfer money a code, which he 
will then communicate to the recipient.176  The hawaladar will contact another 
hawaladar in the target country and instruct him to pay an amount of money to 
the recipient upon presentation of the code.177  The two hawaladars will then 
settle for the balance in some other type of transaction.178  This can include a 
more formal transaction, or invoice manipulation.179  These systems have been 
in existence for an extended period of time, and the vast majority of IVTS 
activity appears to be legitimate in purpose.180  “In countries lacking a stable 
financial sector or containing substantial areas not served by formal financial 
institutions, IVTS may be the only method for conducting financial 
transactions.”181  These types of IVTS can also be used when immigrants are 
sending small amounts of money home to their families and formal value 
transfer systems are too expensive.182  Reports have been mixed with regard to 
the success of regulating these industries.  The same factors which make this 
type of transfer inexpensive also contribute to its potential for abuse.  Although 
it is currently impossible to estimate with any accuracy the amount of money 
that changes hands through this system, it has been estimated to be in the tens 
of billions of dollars annually.183  Even if this industry was not years behind its 
 
 173. Gouvin, supra note 6, at 977–78.  Hawalas are not the only type of IVTS.  ROBINSON, 
supra note 72, at 14.  These systems have been around for a significant period of time, and are 
generally the result of political turmoil or a distrust of banks.  Id.  Although other types of IVTS 
exist in the U.S., considering the timing and purpose of the Patriot Act, it most likely sought to 
regulate hawalas, considering the strong ties to Islam, and evidence that the system has been used 
for terrorist purposes.  See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 978–79. 
 174. See Rachana Pathak, The Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala: A Cultural Norm or a 
Terrorist Hotbed?, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2007, 2011–15 (2004). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Pathak, supra note 174, at 2011–15. 
 180. SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 359 OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING 
AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT 
TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, at 6 (Nov. 2002) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 359]. 
 181. Id. at 5. 
 182. See Pathak, supra note 174, at 2016. 
 183. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 359, supra note 180, at 5. 
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formal value transfer systems counterparts in the regulatory scheme, the 
transfer of illegal proceeds going to terrorists would still be difficult to 
detect.184  The information that is provided by the IVTS reporting must be 
added to the vast amount of information already provided by formal value 
transfer systems.  However, at the very least, those providing the hawala 
services will be required to keep adequate records that can be used by law 
enforcement officials, provided they comply with the regulations.185  With the 
ever increasing regulations on the formal value transfer systems, hawalas 
would become a natural alternative to terrorists seeking to move money 
without leaving a trail.186  While enforcement of these provisions may be 
difficult, it should not be overlooked by law enforcement agencies seeking to 
implement a comprehensive anti-money laundering strategy. 
b. Know Your Customer 
Section 326 of the Patriot Act required the “Secretary of the Treasury [to] 
prescribe regulations setting forth the minimum standards for financial 
institutions and their customers regarding the identity of the customer that shall 
apply in connection with the opening of an account at a financial 
institution.”187  These require banks and other financial institutions to maintain 
accurate records concerning the ownership of accounts.188  The Act also 
requires financial institutions to compare the names of new owners to lists of 
known terrorists.189 
For individuals that are residents of the U.S., obtaining proof of identity 
may be fairly simple.  Generally a driver’s license or passport is sufficient to 
establish identity.190  If the customer is not a U.S. resident, identification still 
 
 184. See Pathak, supra note 174, at 2057–58. 
 185. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 979 (proposing that there will not be substantial compliance 
within the hawala community due to a history of secrecy, and difficulty of identifying hawalas). 
 186. Intuitively, it would seem a natural alternative if terrorist access to the conventional 
banking systems were curtailed.  However, there is evidence that the 9-11 hijackers “did not 
extensively rely on hawala networks.”  Pathak, supra note 174, at 2057. 
 187. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326(a), 115 Stat. 272, 317 (2001) (codified as 
amended in 31 U.S.C. § 5318).  The minimum requirements must include reasonable procedures 
for 
(A) verifying the identity of any person seeking to open an account to the extent 
reasonable and practicable; (B) maintaining records of the information used to verify a 
person’s identity, including name, address, and other identifying information; and (C) 
consulting lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to the 
financial institution by any government agency to determine whether a person seeking to 
open an account appears on any such list. 
Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Michael F. McEneney, David E. Teitelbaum & Karl F. Kaufmann, Customer 
Identification Requirements Under the USA Patriot Act, 59 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1295 (2004). 
 190. Id. at 1292. 
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needs to be confirmed.191  However, regulators have not been clear on exactly 
what types of foreign-issued identification will be sufficient.192  “Know your 
customer” (KYC) provisions were not invented by the Patriot Act.  They were 
first proposed in 1998, but banks and other depositary institutions fought 
strongly against them and won.193  The banks expressed concern over the ever-
increasing quantity of information that they were being required to present to 
the government, and over the eroding privacy of their customers.194  However, 
concern for terrorism after 9-11 again won out when similar provisions were 
enacted by the Patriot Act.195 
c. Anti-Money Laundering Program Provisions 
Section 352 of the Patriot Act requires financial institutions included in the 
Act to establish programs to counter money laundering schemes.196  This 
section of the Act requires “(A) the development of internal policies, 
procedures and controls; (B) the designation of a compliance officer; (C) an 
ongoing employee training program; and (D) an independent audit function to 
test programs.”197  Many banks and other financial institutions already had 
these programs in place, as they were established in the Annunzio–Wylie Anti-
Money Laundering Act of 1992.  The Patriot Act did not substantially alter the 
structure or requirements of these programs. 
d. Information Sharing 
Section 314 of the Patriot Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to 
adopt regulations that will encourage cooperation between financial 
institutions, regulatory authorities, and law enforcement agencies.198  This 
section also required banks to appoint a person to receive information 
 
 191. Id. at 1290. 
 192. Id. at 1290–91.  Information sufficient to identify non-U.S. persons include a passport 
number, a taxpayer identification number, or an alien identification card number.  31 C.F.R. § 
103.121 (b)(2)(i)(A)(4)(ii) (2003).  However, the less specific portion allows the “number and 
country of issuance of any other government-issued document evidencing nationality or residence 
and bearing a photograph or similar safeguard.”  Id. 
 193. Daniel Mulligan, Comment, Know Your Customer Regulations and the International 
Banking System: Towards a General Self-Regulatory Regime, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2324, 
2363–65 (1999).  The KYC provisions in the Patriot Act are not quite as extensive as those 
originally proposed, as they are not designed to address ongoing review or monitoring of 
accounts.  Pasley, supra note 100, at 209. 
 194. See McEneney et al., supra note 189, at 1295. 
 195. Zagaris, supra note 71, at 127–28. 
 196. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 352, 115 Stat. 272, 322 (2001) (codified as amended 
at 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (Supp. I 2003)). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. § 314(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 307. 
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regarding the subjects of the investigations and to monitor their accounts.199  
The section also provided for information-sharing between banks, and it 
relieved them of any liability for sharing the information or for failing to notify 
the subject of the information in the communication.200  The Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network has been charged with coordinating the requests 
between law enforcement agencies and the financial institutions.201  The 
regulations issued by the Secretary do not give FinCEN the power to arbitrarily 
request information from financial institutions.  When a request is made to a 
financial institution, FinCEN must certify, at a minimum, that the individual 
about which the law enforcement agency seeks information “is reasonably 
suspected based on credible evidence of engaging in[] terrorist activity or 
money laundering.”202  FinCEN must also provide “enough specific 
identifiers . . . that would permit a financial institution to differentiate between 
common or similar names.”203  It should be emphasized that while many parts 
of the Patriot Act may be over-inclusive, this section provides access to 
financial records in cases where terrorism is suspected. 
There is some concern that this provision invades the privacy interests of 
the customers of the financial institutions.204  However, given the Supreme 
Court’s long established stance that the customer has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank vis-à-vis the 
government, it would be difficult to challenge the requirements.205 
5. International Action 
The attacks on 9-11 also gave rise to increased international scrutiny of 
money laundering, specifically with respect to the financing of terrorist 
organizations.  While the U.S. has always been a leader in the global 
community with respect to anti-money laundering legislation,206 prior to 9-11, 
there were fundamental differences between the interests of the liberally 
governed European Union, and the more conservatively governed U.S.207  The 
EU, and specifically the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) had already been pursuing bank secrecy and tax havens 
 
 199. Id. § 314(a)(3)(A), 115 Stat. at 307. 
 200. Id. § 314(b), 115 Stat. at 308. 
 201. 31 C.F.R. § 103.100(b) (2005). 
 202. Id. § 103.100(b)(1). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Gouvin, supra note 6, at 983. 
 205. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 206. This is partly because “the U.S. dollar has become the preferred currency of the [drug] 
industry and is inextricably intertwined with money laundering activities.”  Morgan, supra note 
79, at 24. 
 207. See Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 331–32. 
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around the world.208  However, their intent wasn’t so much to curb terrorism or 
other underlying crimes as it was to increase tax revenue.209  This conflicted 
with conservative groups in the U.S. interested in promoting international tax 
competition and attracting foreign investment,210 not to mention with the 
interests of the Caribbean nations themselves.  In May of 2001, then-Treasury 
Secretary Paul O’Neill issued a press release indicating that the U.S. would no 
longer support the OECD working-group targeting “harmful tax practices.”211  
Although O’Neill stressed the need for information exchange, he indicated that 
the U.S. would not support it at the cost of eliminating international tax 
competition.212  However, after 9-11 there was an interest in promoting 
international financial transparency that trumped the desire to promote tax 
competition.213  The U.S. has entered into a number of Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties (MLAT) with foreign nations that provide for the exchange 
of information relating to criminal matters.214  In the case of offshore tax 
havens such as the Cayman Islands, the treaties require that the offense be a 
crime in both jurisdictions, and hence do not allow the exchange of 
information for purely tax purposes.215  This agreement allows the U.S. to 
request specified information regarding Cayman bank accounts from the 
Cayman authorities.216  However, the information may be cumbersome to 
obtain.217  New York County District Attorney Robert Morgenthau indicated 
his hope that the Patriot Act will allow quicker retrieval of foreign records.218 
 
 208. See id. at 330. 
 209. John Burton & Andrew Parker, Is the Global Crackdown on Tax Evasion ‘Slowing to the 
Speed of the Last Ship in the Convoy’?, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at 17. 
 210. See Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 331.  The financial services industry accounts for 
30 percent of the Cayman Islands’ gross domestic product, and many predict that imposing strict 
money laundering regulations on the system might result in flight of capital from both the EU and 
the U.S.  Burton & Parker, supra note 209, at 17. 
 211. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary O’Neill Statement on 
OECD Tax Havens (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ 
po366.htm. 
 212. Id.  Increased international financial reporting has largely been equated with the 
elimination of international tax competition, because the reporting requirements would allow 
governments to tax their citizens on foreign investment, thus eliminating the benefit of investing 
in tax havens. 
 213. Lacey & George, supra note 16, at 332. 
 214. Richard A. Westin, Expatriation and Return: An Examination of Tax-Driven 
Expatriation by United States Citizens, and Reform Proposals, 20 VA. TAX REV. 75, 127–28 
(2000). 
 215. Id. at 127. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Bridging the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 300 
(2004) (statement of Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York County). 
 218. See id. (indicating that the Patriot Act’s requirement for “foreign banks with 
correspondent accounts in the U.S. to appoint an agent for service of process in this country, will 
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The system in place between the Cayman Islands and the U.S. can be seen 
as the opposite of the U.S.’s domestic reporting system.  In the U.S., every 
large or otherwise suspicious activity is reported, resulting in millions of 
reports, many of which are completely legitimate.  In the case of the Cayman 
Islands, the U.S. will not receive any information unless there is an objective 
reason that can be presented to the Cayman authorities. 
The leading international body with respect to anti-money laundering laws 
is the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF).219  The 
FATF was formed in 1989 at the G-7 Summit in order to address issues of 
international money laundering activity.220  The FATF created a list of forty 
recommendations for countries wishing to prevent international money 
laundering.221  These forty recommendations have been updated since 1990, 
when they were first established.222  In October of 2001, the mission of the 
FATF was extended to include all types of international activities used to 
finance terrorism.223  The FATF then created eight new recommendations 
specifically aimed at curbing terrorist financing.224  These recommendations 
largely mirror legislation already enacted in the U.S. and discussed in Part II.B. 
of this Comment.225  Two of the recommendations are specifically aimed at 
international cooperation.226  The first recommends that all countries “ratify 
and . . . implement fully the 1999 United Nations International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.”227  The fifth recommends that 
countries establish by treaty information-sharing agreements with other 
countries.228 
 
help to circumvent some of the current complexities and obstacles in the MLAT process, as it 
applies to foreign banks”). 
 219. The FATF is made up of twenty-six member nations, all of whom have enacted some 
form of anti-money laundering legislation.  Daley, supra note 40, at 187.  The FATF 
“[r]ecommendations [were] the first to stress, in an international forum, the need for financial 
institutions to use their expertise to detect suspicious transactions and to notify the appropriate 
authorities.”  Id. 
 220. Barbot, supra note 75, at 173–74. 
 221. Sean D. Murphy, Multilateral Listing of States as Money-Laundering Havens, 94 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 695, 696 (2000). 
 222. Id. at 696 n.5. 
 223. Andrew Ayers, The Financial Action Task Force: The War on Terrorism Will Not be 
Fought on the Battlefield, N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 449, 451 (2002). 
 224. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/55/16/ 
34266142.pdf. 
 225. See id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at ¶ I. 
 228. Id. at ¶ V. 
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The UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism was adopted on December 9, 1999.229  The UN first addressed the 
issue of international money laundering in 1988 with the Vienna Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.230  The 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
prohibits direct involvement or complicity in the international and unlawful 
provision or collection of funds, attempted or actual, with the intent or 
knowledge that any part of the funds may be used to carry out any of the 
offenses described in the Convention, such as those acts intended to cause 
death or serious bodily injury to any person not actively involved in armed 
conflict in order to intimidate a population, and any act intended to compel a 
government or an international organization to take action or abstain from 
taking action.231 
In addition to prohibiting the act of money laundering, the Convention also 
requires signatories to take domestic action “for the detection, freezing, 
seizure, and forfeiture of any funds used or allocated for the purposes of 
committing the listed offenses.”232  These requirements involve KYC 
regulations and suspicious transaction reporting similar to those already in use 
in the U.S.233  On September 12, 2001, in the wake of the attacks of 9-11, the 
UN Security Counsel adopted Resolution 1368 condemning the terrorist 
attacks and calling on member nations to adopt previous conventions regarding 
terrorism.234 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF CURRENT ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION 
The BSA as amended by the Patriot Act provides valuable tools to law 
enforcement agencies not only in preventing the financing of terrorism, but 
also in other areas of the law.  The tools included in the Patriot Act 
complement existing legislation and give law enforcement agencies the ability 
to more effectively trace the proceeds of money that is provided to terrorists 
both at home and abroad.  Although it has been argued that the increased 
regulations on U.S. financial institutions will leave them at a competitive 
disadvantage with other less regulated countries, the financial institutions may 
 
 229. Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 537, 539 
n.6 (2004). 
 230. Zagaris, supra note 71, at 137. 
 231. Id. at 138. 
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actually see some long-term benefit.235  Further, the Patriot Act does not create 
any significant new privacy issues. 
A. Benefits to Law Enforcement 
The amendments to the BSA in the Patriot Act have already proven 
beneficial to law enforcement officials.  FinCEN has established a direct case 
support program that functions as a clearing house for information collected 
pursuant to the Patriot Act.236  FinCEN was established with the purpose of 
assisting all federal agencies with obtaining information relating to terrorist 
financing and money laundering.237  Section 314(a) allows law enforcement 
agencies to request information regarding suspects, businesses, and 
accounts.238  The requested information is then either provided using the 
information that FinCEN has already collected, or passed on to more than 
20,000 financial institutions in an attempt to obtain the information.239  
FinCEN then coordinates the retrieval of the information from the financial 
institutions and directs the law enforcement agency to the source of the 
information.240  According to FinCEN, its direct case support program 
“provides an average of 5,000 analytical case reports each year involving over 
25,000 individual subjects annually to federal, state, local, and international 
agencies.”241  During the period from February 2003 to June 2004, FinCEN 
reports that the inquiries resulted in 1,236 new accounts located, 73 new 
transactions identified, 601 grand jury subpoenas served, eleven search 
warrants executed, nine individuals indicted, and two individuals arrested.242  
The fact that this may seem like a small number of individuals indicted and 
arrested considering the scope of the regulatory scheme should not necessarily 
be considered a failure.  The success of the program would not necessarily 
 
 235. See, e.g., George A. Lyden, The International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-
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 236. Financial Crimes Enforcement Net, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Law Enforcement / 
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 242. BANK SECRECY ACT ADVISORY GROUP, 7 SAR ACTIVITY REV. 29–30 (2004), available 
at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480025.pdf. 
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hinge on the number of indictments, but rather the ability to provide valuable 
information to other law enforcement agencies. 
The direct case support program operated by FinCEN provides information 
to programs such as the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) of the 
FBI’s Counterterrorism Divison.243  This section was formed in response the 
perceived shortcomings in the FBI’s ability to analyze terrorist financing 
efforts shortly after 9-11.244  Using the information collected pursuant to the 
Patriot Act, TFOS utilizes the data for a variety of purposes including: (1) 
“conducting full financial analysis of terrorist suspects and their financial 
support structures in the US and abroad”; (2) “developing predictive models 
and conducting data analysis to facilitate the identification of previously 
unknown or ‘sleeper’ terrorist suspects”; and (3) “providing the financial 
component to classified counterterrorism investigations in support of the FBI’s 
counterterrorism responsibilities.”245 
While some have criticized the ability of the Patriot Act to ferret out 
individual acts of terrorism, the purpose of the Act is to complement other 
areas of law enforcement, rather than to replace them.  The 9-11 Commission 
emphasized this in its report, finding that “[c]ounterterrorism investigations 
often overlap or are cued by other criminal investigations, such as money 
laundering.”246  The Act is being used in conjunction with traditional 
intelligence and law enforcement methods to attack the “financial substructure 
of terrorist groups.”247  Juan Carlos Zarate, the assistant secretary of the 
Treasury for terrorist financing, has emphasized that “[f]inancial records and 
audits provide blueprints to the architecture of terrorist organizations.”248  This 
information helps law enforcement agencies determine the sources of terrorist 
funding, and diminishes the terrorists’ ability to recruit members, carry out 
attacks, and purchase dangerous weapons.249 
B. The Competitive Position of U.S. Financial Institutions 
Financial institutions have been subject to reporting requirements for over 
thirty years and yet have maintained their competitive position in the world 
market.  When the legislation was first introduced, a senior counsel for the 
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American Bankers Associations stated that “[t]he practical effect will be fairly 
minimal,” and the legislation “simply puts into statute what happens daily in a 
financial institution.”250  The additional reporting requirements of the Patriot 
Act are unlikely to substantially alter their competitive position.  Moreover, the 
reporting process is consistently becoming more efficient.  FinCen has recently 
put into operation the Patriot Act Communication System (PACS), which will 
allow many financial institutions to send CTRs and SARs electronically, and in 
batches.251  Electronic submission of required reports will not only reduce 
costs to the financial institutions in the form of time and materials, but will 
allow the reports to be processed more efficiently.252  However, the number of 
reports that are filed needs to be, and can be under the current regulatory 
scheme, reduced significantly if the reports are to be used efficiently.253  
Congress has called for regulations that would decrease the number of reports 
filed each year multiple times.254  Reducing the number of reports would have 
a number of effects.  One would be to reduce the burden on banks by allowing 
them to more selectively determine which transactions to report.  Another 
would be the increased ability of federal agencies to more thoroughly analyze 
the remaining reports.255  The budget of FinCEN is currently insufficient to 
provide adequate resources to analyze the number of reports currently being 
submitted.256  This does not encourage timely and consistent filing by financial 
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institutions.  FinCEN has also expressed concern over the practice of 
“defensive” reporting with regard to SARs.257  Due to the increased scrutiny of 
anti-money laundering compliance after the enactment of the Patriot Act, many 
financial institutions have been over-reporting suspicious activity for fear of 
being penalized.258  Another factor that contributes to over-reporting 
suspicious activity may be the “safe harbor” provisions that protect banks from 
liability for unjustifiably filing an SAR.259 
Both the FBI and FinCEN have been implementing data analysis of current 
and past reports that will allow them to develop more clear guidelines for use 
in determining when certain reports should be filed.260  FinCEN’s efforts to 
automate the reporting system should allow them to analyze the data faster, 
and provide important feedback to the institutions.261  Furthermore, section 
314(d)(1) of the Patriot Act specifically requires the Secretary of the Treasury 
to “publish a report containing a detailed analysis identifying patterns of 
suspicious activity and other investigative insights derived from suspicious 
activity reports and investigations conducted by Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement agencies to the extent appropriate,” and to provide this 
information to financial institutions.262 
The financial institutions regulated by anti-money laundering legislation 
are in a unique position to administer the programs, as much of the information 
that is required, particularly by the “know your customer” (KYC) provisions, 
would be obtained through the regular practices of the bank.263  As far back as 
1997, banks have been encouraged to develop KYC programs on their own 
initiative, as the information is often needed to properly file reports required by 
other provisions of the BSA such as SARs and CTRs.264  Further, many of 
these financial institutions are controlled by shareholders, or at the least by an 
owner interested in profits.  Therefore, the owners or shareholders have a 
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vested interest in ensuring that the programs are administered in the most 
efficient manner possible. 
The Patriot Act has a substantial effect on foreign financial institutions that 
wish to do business in the U.S.265  This effect will require many financial 
institutions, most of which cannot afford to surrender their access to the largest 
financial market in the world, to maintain policies with regard to record 
keeping similar to U.S. financial institutions.266  This will therefore lessen any 
competitive disadvantage that would arise from the U.S. regulatory scheme.  
Also, many of the provisions enacted in the Patriot Act are being advocated by 
the U.S. and international organizations in other areas of the world, including 
other major banking systems.267  Due to the increasing ease of transferring 
money between different financial institutions in the different countries, it is 
clear that money laundering cannot be addressed by concentrating on only 
domestic enforcement.  International organizations such as the FATF have 
been attempting to implement more stringent reporting requirements across the 
globe.268  In fact, many components of the Patriot Act mirror the anti-money 
laundering provisions that are included in the FATF’s Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (“Nine Special Recommendations”), 
and the U.N. Security Counsel’s Regulation 1373.269  For instance, one of the 
Nine Special Recommendations is that “[i]f financial institutions[,] or other 
businesses or entities subject to anti-money laundering obligations, suspect or 
have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are linked or related to, or are to 
be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organisations, they should be 
required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities.”270  
This was implemented in the U.S. through the use of SARs and by requiring 
other financial institutions besides banks to implement reporting procedures.  
Another of the Nine Special Recommendations that was codified in U.S. law is 
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Special Recommendation VI, which recommends the licensing and registration 
of informal value transfer systems.271  Most of the other Nine Special 
Recommendations can also be found codified in U.S. law.272  As off-shore 
banking centers come under increased scrutiny for enabling criminals and 
terrorists alike, it is likely that the major financial powers in the world will 
demand more transparency.273  The U.S. could benefit from establishing a 
comprehensive anti-money laundering program now, before they are forced to 
in order to participate in the global financial system. 
C. Privacy Concerns 
Although there are privacy concerns, there is little evidence that in the 
thirty years since the BSA has been enacted it has been significantly abused.  
Many commentators arguing that the reporting requirements violate the 
privacy of customers have referred to the violations in the abstract, rather than 
providing specific examples of abuses.  Critics of the requirements rarely can 
point to specific instances of privacy violations.  It can also be argued that the 
minimal invasion of privacy incurred when simple financial information is 
disclosed to the government is justified by the dangers that money laundering 
and terrorism pose to the global financial structure.274  Although there is a risk 
of bogging down the financial industry with over-regulation, there is a greater 
risk involved with allowing the financial industry to be corrupted by criminal 
activity. 
The KYC provisions of the Patriot Act have been particularly heavily 
criticized.  However, as mentioned before, the KYC provisions merely codify a 
practice that generally is needed by banks to comply with SAR and CTR 
reporting.275  The KYC provisions may even lead to an increase in privacy.  If 
a bank is satisfied that it has correctly ascertained the identity of a customer, 
and has some information regarding the transactional history, then transactions 
that may have seemed suspicious if isolated will no longer be considered 
suspicious.276  Congress has provided for certain situations where transactions 
that would otherwise be subject to reporting requirements are exempt because 
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of the minimal risk they pose.277  Therefore, it seems that what is actually 
under attack are the reporting requirements themselves, which have been in 
effect for a considerable length of time.  The validity of these reporting 
requirements has been upheld since the Court decided in favor of the process in 
California Bankers Ass’n.278  Further, in U.S. v. Miller,279 the Supreme Court 
held that bank customers did not have the right to challenge subpoenas issued 
by the government to obtain bank records.280  Therefore, even if government 
investigators were required to obtain subpoenas for every request of 
information, the banks, rather than the customers, would be responsible for 
challenging the subpoenas. 
Further, the KYC provision that requires financial institutions to compare 
the names of customers to lists of suspected terrorists may be one of the most 
effective means of detecting terrorist financing.281  According to FinCEN, 
since the implementation of the policy, “the system has been used to send the 
names of 1,547 persons suspected of terrorism financing or money laundering 
to more than 26,000 financial institutions and has produced 10,560 matches 
that were passed on to law enforcement.”282 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While some critics have claimed that the anti-money laundering laws as 
written will not protect the U.S. from terrorism in the future, they may be 
viewing the issue too myopically.  Although many of the changes may not be 
able to ferret out individual acts of terrorism, they will substantially limit 
access to U.S. financial systems to terrorists, and make it more difficult to 
move money.  It will also identify the sources of terrorist funding, allowing 
law enforcement to attack terrorism at its base.  Implementing such a 
comprehensive money laundering strategy will no doubt take time to work out 
the problems.283 
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Title III of the Patriot Act is not a perfect instrument for combating the 
financing of terrorism.  However, given the scale of international money 
laundering, and the extent of global terrorist networks, it would be difficult to 
establish any piece of legislation that could put a significant dent in present 
levels of criminal activity.  The American people are right to be concerned 
about privacy and their civil liberties.  With this in mind, it should be observed 
that at least with respect to Title III of the Patriot Act, the general balance 
between privacy and security has remained largely unchanged.  While the 
Patriot Act has expanded the number of institutions that are subject to 
reporting requirements, and codified minimum due diligence procedures, it has 
not significantly invaded our private lives beyond what has been law for over 
thirty years.  The Patriot Act addresses important loopholes in the anti-money 
laundering scheme that have been exploited to the detriment of the financial 
system.  It also provides a much needed focus on the international nature of 
money laundering.  The balance between privacy and security is an important 
discussion, but the issue should be the overall anti-money laundering scheme, 
rather than simply the Patriot Act.  The Patriot Act provides valuable tools to 
law enforcement, without significantly intruding on civil liberties, and should 
therefore be extended by Congress past the scheduled sunset date. 
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